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Security Vulnerabilities of the Artificial Pancreas 
Proposed Cryptographic Solutions
Daniel J. Cooke, Andres Guzman, Brooklyn Mesia, Jacob Palmer, Shawn Shields, and Milan Zanussi
Introduction
We live in a world of cyber-enabled, wireless devices that 
enhance many aspects of life, including treatment of diabetes. 
Type I Diabetes is a chronic autoimmune disorder characterized 
by the destruction of pancreatic B-cells and subsequent 
deficiency of insulin - a crucial hormone in the regulation of 
blood glucose levels. Current treatment includes monitoring 
blood glucose levels and administration of insulin injections, but 
development of an Artificial Pancreas is automating the 
maintenance of this disease. Implantable Medical Devices (IMD) 
are shrinking in physical size which limits their storage, power, 
and processing capacity resulting in the unsecure transmission of 
data. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
has called for encryption algorithms to be considered as the 
lightweight cryptographic standard to combat these 
vulnerabilities. Our team implemented one encryption algorithm 
with our simulation of an Artificial Pancreas.
●
Artificial Pancreas
(1) Continuous Glucose Monitor (CGM):  records ongoing 
blood sugar readings and measures glucose concentrations in 
the interstitial fluid of the patient’s cells
(2) Control Algorithm (CAD): sensor readings are received 
and analyzed to calculate the correct insulin dose required
(3) Insulin pump (cannula inserted under the skin): 
administration of the correct insulin dose per that time
(4) Patient Effect: the patient’s glucose levels respond to the 
delivery of insulin
Figure 1: The loop and communication channels of the Artificial Pancreas System [5]
Challenges and Limitations of 
Artificial Pancreas System
● Insulin sensitivity varies due to time of day, stress levels,
exercise/activity levels, and food intake.
● Securing transmission of data between devices
● Computational power and battery life
● Hypoglycemia
Once insulin is in the body it cannot be removed
Experimental Design
We built a simulation of the Artificial Pancreas to demonstrate 
the vulnerabilities and to mitigate unencrypted data and 
unauthorized access. The simulation uses Raspberry Pi 
computers to imitate a control algorithm device and insulin 
pump. Another Raspberry Pi uses WireShark, a packet analyzer, 
to intercept the communication between devices. This design 
allows us to encrypt the transmitted data and measure the 
additional resources consumed by the security features.
Figure 2: Components of each Raspberry Pi in the simulation 
OpenAPS Algorithm
OpenAPS is an open-source project to build an Artificial Pancreas 
using older medical devices and a Raspberry Pi computer to 
monitor glucose levels and deliver insulin. 
Figure 3: Example of the hardware used in an OpenAPS system [4] 
Securing Data Transmission 
To demonstrate the need for added security features, we show 
how an adversary can remotely suspend delivery of insulin, 
command the pump to dispense insulin, and view personal 
medical information broadcasted over an unencrypted channel. 
Figure 4: Highlighted in red is the command to suspend the delivery of insulin and the pump’s response. 
Figure 5: The left shows asking the pump for setting information. Highlighted in red are the max Basal 
and Bolus settings that can be exploited when commanding the pump to deliver insulin. On the right, the 
pump has no indication that these settings are being accessed.
Figure 6: The pump can be commanded to deliver insulin. The terminal warns that this command is 
very dangerous, even though no further authentication is required.
Fork: Authenticated Encryption
ForkAE is a lightweight authenticated encryption scheme 
optimized for short messages. Fork is a 2nd-round candidate 
for the NIST Lightweight Cryptographic Standard. In [1], it is 
claimed that Fork is an appropriate cryptosystem for resource 
constrained devices including IMDs. Figure 7 depicts the 
mathematical structure of one round of Fork.
Figure 7: Structure of one round of Fork [1]
Fork: Security Analysis 
The forking procedure introduced in Fork creates two separate 
copies of ciphertext for the same corresponding plaintext, but adds 
an extra constant to one of the copies of the block and encodes both 
blocks using the same encryption algorithm and key. Each branch 
can be regarded as its own permutation of the same set of 
messages.
Theorem: Let F : {0,1}n1 → {0,1}
n be the permutation performed 
by the first branch and F : {0,1}n2 → {0,1}
n be the permutation 
performed by the second branch. Then the subgroup generated 
by F  and F  is a subgroup of the alternating group on {0,1}n.1 2
Future Work 
The preliminary actions of this project created versatility in the 
experimental potential of lightweight devices. Further research 
is required to demonstrate the vulnerabilities of the current 
communication protocols, measure the resource consumption 
of the APS design enhanced with security features, and to 
compare the security and resource consumption of ForkAE to 
other encryption schemes. Our goal is to propose a solution to 
securing the Artificial Pancreas, transferable to other IMDs like 
pacemakers, neurostimulators, and cardioverter defibrillators. 
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